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Salzman and Chew: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Molina v. Richardson, J the plaintiff filed a civil rights
action against two Los Angeles police officers seeking compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 2 for
alleged violations of his constitutional rights. 3 He named as an
additional defendant the City of Los Angeles and sought damages
from the city under the principle of vicarious liability, as the
employer of the police officers, based, in part, on section 1983 and
on the general "federal question" jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.
section 1331. 4 The city was granted a dismissal for failure to state
a cause of action and the case against the officers resulted in a
jury award of $65.75 compensatory damages against each of
them. 5 Molina appealed the dismissal of the claim against the
city. The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the dismissal, held that
section 1983 precludes municipal liability based solely on the
1. 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. July, 1978) (per Wallace, J.; Grant, D.J., sitting by designation filed a dissenting opinion; the other panel member was Wright, J.).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Molina had been stopped by the police officers while driving in Los Angeles because the rear license plate of his automobile lacked a current registration sticker. He
showed the sticker to the officers and gave an explanation. A dispute arose and Molina
was forcibly removed from the vehicle by the officers, handcuffed, taken to the police
station, and booked for resisting arrest. No charges were filed against him. The alleged
violations included his "Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest unless based upon
probable cause, his guarantee under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment." 578 F.2d at 847.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) provides in relevant part: "(a) The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." Molina alleged damages in excess of $10,000 and,
to meet the "federal question" requirement, asserted that "a cause of action for vicarious
liability . . . may be inferred directly from the text ofthe Fourteenth Amendment." 578
F.2d at 848.
5. [d. at 847.
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doctrine of respondeat superior and refused to find such cause of
action arising directly from the fourteenth amendment. 6

B.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES

Pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment, and
partially in response to unredressed violence against former
slaves in the post-Civil War South,7 Congress enacted the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C. sections 19811985 (the Act). It was not until ninety years later, in Monroe v.
Pape,8 that the United States Supreme Court expanded the scope
of the Act by its interpretation of the phrase "under color of"
state law. 9 The Court held that section 1983 granted a cause of
action for damages against police officers who had allegedly violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 1o
In so doing, however, the Court limited the scope of potential
defendants to individuals. II Relying primarily on the Congressional Debates surrounding the unsuccessful Sherman Amendment to the Act, the Monroe Court concluded that the 1871 Congress did not intend that local governments be included in the
definition of "person" for purposes of section 1983. 12 The Court
granted municipal governments absolute immunity from liability
under the section. 13
6. [d. at 848.
7. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-73 (1961).
8. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
9. Quoting with approval the meaning given to "under color of' state law in United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 325, 326 by Justice Stone (later Chief Justice): "[Mjisuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of state law." 365 U.S.
at 184.
10. [d. at 187. The Monroe family had been awakened in the middle of the night by
thirteen Chicago police officers who broke into their home, ordered Mr. and Mrs. Monroe
and their children into the living room, ordered them to strip naked, emptied the closets
and drawers during a "search" throughout the home, and finally took Mr. Monroe to the
police station where he was held for 10 hours without seeing a magistrate, and finally
released without charges being filed. [d. at 169.
11. See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword,
85 HARV. L. REv. 1534 (1972); Kates and Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131 (1972); Note, Damages Remedies
Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REv. 922 (1976).
12. "The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for
certain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so
antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act
to include them." 365 U.S. at 191 (footnote omitted).
13. [d. at 187.
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While some lower courts avoided the harsh result of Monroe
v. Pape by finding a cause of action against municipalities derived directly from the Constitution,14 the Supreme Court, in
Moor v. County of Alameda, 15 adhered to its holding in Monroe
that a municipality is not a "person" under section 1983. In Moor,
Justice Marshall, writing for eight members of the Court, held
that the county was immune from liability notwithstanding a
California statute making the county vicariously liable for the
acts of its officers. Ie
Finally, seventeen years after the Monroe decision, in Monell
v. Department of Social Services, 17 the Supreme Court reviewed
once again the legislative history of the Act and decided that the
Monroe Court had misinterpreted the intent of Congress, and
overruled that portion of the holding in Monroe v. Pape which
granted absolute immunity to-municipal governments. IS The
Monell Court held that municipalities are, in fact, "persons" for
purposes of section 1983. \9
14. See note 48 infra.
15. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
16. One of the plaintiffs, Rundle, had attempted to hold the county liable through
42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides, in relevant part:

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the
district courts . . . for the protection of all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of
the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the
same into effect; but in all cases where they. . . are deficient
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies. . . the
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). His argument was that § 1983 was insufficient to vindicate his
rights in that municipalities were immune from liability and that, therefore, California's
vicarious liability statute should govern by way of § 1988. The Court held that the state's
statute was inconsistent with federal law and § 1988, therefore, was not applicable. 411
U.S. at 706. The logic of this holding was somewhat strained by the particular facts of
the case. Two plaintiffs, Moor and Rundle, were allegedly injured by the wrongful discharge of a shotgun by an Alameda County deputy sheriff while engaged in quelling a civil
disturbance. [d. at 695. The cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. [d. at 698.
Moor was not a citizen of California and had relied on diversity jurisdiction. [d. at 696.
Based on diversity jurisdiction, Moor was permitted to maintain his action for damages
pursuant to California law for constitutional violations for which Rundle had no remedy.
[d. at 721.
17. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
18. [d. at 663.
19. [d. at 690. See Note, Liability of State and Local Governments Under 42 U.S.C.
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In Monell, a class of female employees of New York City's
Board of Education and Department of Social Services sued the
city, the Board, the Department, and certain individuals in their
official capacities for alleged violations of their constitutional
rights by defendants' policy offorcing pregnant employees to take
unpaid leaves of absence before medically necessary. The action
was based upon section 1983. 20
The Court meticulously re-examined the legislative debates
on the Act of 1871 and determined that the Monroe Court's reliance on the rejection of the Sherman Amendment was misplaced. 21 In addition, only a few months prior to passage of the
Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress had passed the Dictionary Act in
which the word "person" is defined to "include corporations ...
as well as individuals. "22 Two years prior to the enactment of both
Acts municipal corporations were included in the definition of
corporations. 23 Thus, the Monell Court overruled the holding in
Monroe that municipalities enjoy absolute immunity under section 1983.
Although vicarious liability was not an issue in Monell, as all
individuals were sued only in their official capacities and the
alleged violations resulted from government policy, the Monell
Court concluded
that a local government may not be sued under §
1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees
or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts
the injury that the government as an entity is re.
sponsible under § 1983.24

The Monell Court, although not compelled to do so under the
facts before it, denied any liability of municipalities based on the
doctrin~ of respondeat superior. 25
§ 1983, 92 HARV. L. REv. 311 (1978).
20. 436 U.S. at 660·61.
21. [d. at 669.
22. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); see 436 U.S. at 689 n. 53.
23. [d. at 688, citing Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. 118, 121 (1868).
24. 436 U.S. at 694.
25. [d.
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DAMAGES ACTIONS ARISING DIRECTLY OUT OF THE CONSTITUTION

In Bell v. Hood,28 the Supreme Court decided that federal
courts have jurisdiction to entertain actions for damages for the
invasion of constitutional rights. In that case, plaintiffs brought,
an action against FBI agents for alleged violations of plaintiffs'
fourth and fifth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and deprivation of liberty without due process. 27 The district court dismissed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, for want of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section
41(1) (now 28 U.S.C. section 1331), the general "federal question"
jurisdiction statute. 28 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"where the complaint, as here, is so drawn as to seek recovery
directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the.
federal court, but for two possible exceptions later noted, must
entertain the suit. "29 The Bell Court did not decide whether a
cause of action for damages may be had directly out of the 'Constitution.
The opportunity to decide the second question, whether alleged deprivation of constitutional rights would give rise to a
cause of action for damages not expressly authorized by statute,
came before the Court in 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 30 In an opinion written by Justice
Brennan, the Court answered that question in the affirmative. 31
The case arose under a similar fact situation as that in Bell v.
Hood. Plaintiff sued federal narcotics agents for alleged violations
of his fourth and fifth amendment rights and sought damages in
excess of the jurisdictional requirement as a result of defendants'
unlawful conduct. The district court dismissed, and the Second
Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action. 32
In reversing, the Supreme Court made clear the fact that the
fourth amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches
26. 327 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1946).
27. [d. at 679.
28. [d. at 680.
29. [d. at 681-82. The two possible exceptions are (1) where the federal claim is
immaterial and asserted only to obtain jurisdiction; and (2) where the claim is frivolous.
[d. at 682-83.
30. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
31. [d. at 397.
32. [d. at 390.
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and seizures "carried out by virtue of federal authority"33 and
that the guarantee is not dependant upon a remedy provided by
the state in which the violation occurred. 34 Acknowledging that
special factors, in some cases, might call for hesitation in finding
a cause of action directly out of the Constitution "in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress, "35 the Court found no such
factors in Bivens. 36
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion found the question
involved to be "whether compensatory relief is 'necessary' or
'appropriate' to the vindication of the interest asserted."37 He
determined that damages would be the only possible remedy for
Bivens, and based his decision on (1) the inadequacy of state tort
law remedies; (2) sovereign immunity barring suit against the
agents' employer; (3) the inadequacy of injunctive relief; and (4)
the irrelevance of the exclusionary rule. 3s
The Bivens decision was interpreted almost immediately as
a possible route around the harshness of the Monroe decision. 3D
The rationale was that due to municipal immunity from section
1983 liability (at least prior to Monell) the courts should infer
"necessity" of a direct cause of action arising directly out of the
fourteenth amendment against municipalities. State remedies
may be inadequate. 4o In addition, section 1983 actions against the
responsible officials, rather than the municipal employer, are
often only illusory. The difficulty of identifying the responsible
individual, the lack of financial means to support a judgment,
and the broad "good faith" defense of officials acting within the
scope of their employment often prevent plaintiffs from pursuing
their claims against the responsible individualsY Similarly, jurors are often unwilling to impose substantial judgments against
33. [d. at 392.
34. [d. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. [d. at 396.
36. The special factors enumerated in the opinion include (1) federal fiscal policy;
(2) liability of a congressional employee; and (3) "explicit congressional declaration that
persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover
money damages from the agents." [d. at 396-97.
37. [d. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. [d. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. See generally authorities cited at note 11 supra.
40. 403 U.S. at 391-95.
41. See Dellinger, supra note 11, at 1553; Kates and Kouba, supra note 11, at 13637; Note, supra note 11, at 922-23.
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individuals who have merely erred in doing their jobs}2 Finally,
social policy may favor spreading the risks and holding municipalities liable to deter continuation of governmental policies
which prove to be contrary to constitutional requirements. 43
In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 44 the Supreme Court, by implication, extended the Bivens doctrine in holding that municipalities may be sued for constitutional violations directly under the
fourteenth amendment. 45 In that case, plaintiffs brought suit
under section 1983 for injunctive relief against the cities of Racine
and Kenosha, Wisconsin. Relying entirely on Monroe v. Pape, the
Court held that municipalities were not "persons" under section
1983 for purposes of injunctive relief. However, the Court remanded to the district court to consider jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. section 1331 and the protection against denial of "liberty"
and "property" without due process as provided by the fourteenth amendment. 48 The case has been read equally as an extension of Monroe to suits for injunctive relief and as an extension
of the Bivens doctrine to include suits against municipalities as
arising directly out of the fourteenth amendment. 47 Lower courts,
relying on the "inadequacy of other remedies" argument of
Bivens, and the implied carte blanche of Bruno have extended
the Bivens doctrine to include suits against municipalities for
violations of constitutional rights}S This is, in fact, what the
42. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 421-22 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
43. Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 148 (E.D.Pa. 1977).
44. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
45. Id. at 514-15.
46.Id.
47. See, e.g., Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 732, 735 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
48. See generally Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F.
Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (extension of Bivens doctrine to municipality for vicarious
liability); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D.Cal. 1974) (zoning); but see
Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), on remand,
591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (The circuit court extended Bivens to action against municipality for acts of police officers sanctioned by the city. The Supreme Court remanded to
the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of Monell. On remand, the circuit
court decided that it would be unnecessary to extend Bivens because of the action, available since Monell, under § 1983.); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir.
1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 902 (1978), on remand, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978). Cf. Williams
v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill., 1975) (extended Bivens doctrine to a municipality
for acts of police officers on respondeat superior theory; the holding was later rejected by
the Seventh Circuit in Jamison v. McCunie, 565 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1977), which refused
to hold a city liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior) .
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Ninth Circuit was asked, but refused to do in Molina v.
Richardson.
D.

THE

Molina

DECISION

In affirming the district court's dismissal of Molina's claim
against the city, the Ninth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's
decision in Monell (decided only a few weeks prior to Molina) and
determined that the new, but limited, municipal liability afforded under section 1983 did not extend to Molina's claim, which
was allegedly based solely on respondeat superior.49 The court
then decided that plaintiffs argument for a cause of action arising directly out of the fourteenth amendment, by analogy to
Bivens, was not constitutionally mandated5U and would be an
"unwise use of judicial power. "51

E.

THE

Monell

TEST

The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected Molina's section 1983
claim by following the dicta in Monell to the effect that a municipality cannot be held liable under that statute "solely because it
employs a tortfeasor."52 The doctrine of respondeat superior was
not an issue before the Court in Monell, where the violations
alleged were done pursuant to governmental policy.53 In overruling Monroe, Monell made it clear that municipalities may be
sued for constitutional violations subject to vindication under
section 1983. 54 It is obvious, at least since the Monell decision,
that a local government may be held liable to a plaintiff who can
prove that an ordinance passed by the governmental unit constituted an uncompensated taking of property and the plaintiff was
injured thereby.55 It is equally obvious from the dicta in Monell
that a municipality may not be held liable solely because a policeman, rather than a private individual, was involved in an
automobile accident in which plaintiff was injured."6 However,
there is a broad range of possibilities between these two examples
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

578 F.2d at 848.
[d. at 850.
[d. at 851.
436 U.S. at 691.
[d. at 661.
54. [d. at 663.
55. See Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978). Indeed, causes of
action for such violations have been granted prior to Monell by extending Bivens. See,
e.g., Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D.Cal. 1974).
56. 436 U.S. at 691.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/7
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in which to find varying degrees of culpable action or inaction on
the part of the municipal employer. Should the municipal employer be liable for injuries occurring during a riot? What if the
municipality had never trained its police officers in techniques
and procedures for quelling a riot? The answer to the second
question may, in fact, be in the affirmative. But to find the answer, more information is required than that contained in the
Monell opinion.
The Ninth Circuit, without the benefit of further clarification as to where the line should be drawn, relied on the pleadings
and argument of Molina, submitted prior to Monell, which did
not meet the requisite degree of "official policy."57 A more reasonable approach would have been to remand to the district court
to determine whether Molina could have stated a cause of action
to meet the new Monell test. 58 This is especially true since, at the
time Molina was before the district court, a municipality was
clearly not a potential defendant under section 1983, and he had
no legal reason to argue otherwise. While the dicta denying vicarious liability is strong, the Supreme Court in Monell allowed for
much latitude in its test for liability.
Moreover, although the touchstone of the § 1983
action against a government body is an allegation
that official policy is responsible for a deprivation
of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like every other § 1983 "person," by the
very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such a custom has
not received formal approval through the body's
official decisionmaking channels. 5D
57. Quoting Monell, the Molina court held: "Molina did not argue before the district
court that the allegedly illegal conduct of the officers 'may fairly be said to represent [the
city's] official policy.' Thus, Monell does not give Molina a section 1983 cause of action
against the city." 578 F.2d at 848 (emphasis and alteration in the original).
58. It is not uncommon for appellate courts to remand for consideration in light of
new law, see Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978) (extended Bivens and
remanded in light of Monell), or with leave to amend the pleadings, see Hitt v. City of
Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1977). In addition, the duty of the appellate court is to
apply the law existing at the time of the decision. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 76-77 (1977);
Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
59. 436 U.S. at 690-91 (emphasis added).
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Bivens

In deciding that a direct, constitutional cause of action would
not be appropriate under the circumstances of Molina's claim,
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the history of the Bivens doctrine and
the implications of its possible extension in this case.
First, the Ninth Circuit noted that one purpose of the Bivens
decision was to fill a gap left by the legislature in creating a
remedy for constitutional violations. so Section 1983 made available a cause of action for deprivations committed "under color
of' state law.81 The legislature has not acted in the same fashion
to redress constitutional violations committed under color of federal law. The Bivens Court "strongly implied that specific congressional action might have precluded the judicial creation of a
damages remedy in that case,"82 thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Bivens decision was not constitutionally mandated and; therefore, an extension of the doctrine is likewise not
compelled. 83 Once the court found that an extension of the doctrine was not required by the Constitution, it went on to analyze
the prudential considerations involved in such an extension to
include municipal liability.
The Molina court based its decision not to extend Bivens to
include vicarious liability of the municipal employer, in part, out
of deference to the legislature. In comparing Molina's claim to
that of Bivens, the court noted the immense body of legislation
resulting from the fourteenth amendment. 84 Legislation pursuant
to the enabling clause80 of the fourteenth amendment has been
sparse in the area of vicarious liability, however. 66 Because of that
sparseness, the Monell Court had,concluded that the legislative
history of section 1983 shows an intent to exclude vicarious liability of municipalities. 87 The Ninth Circuit accepted this conclu60. 578 F.2d at 851.
61. [d.
62. [d. at 850.
63. [d. at 850-51.

64. Congress has produced legislation regulating state action not only in the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871 and other 19th Century civil rights statutes but also, quite substantially,
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [d. at 851.
.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce. by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
66. 578 F.2d at 851 n. 12.
67. 436 U.S. at 691.
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sion and determined that it would be inappropriate for the federal
judiciary to disregard the clearly cautionary view of the legislature with regard to vicarious liability.68 District Judge Grant, in
his dissenting opinion to the Molina decision, strongly rejected
this argument. Basing his analysis upon the ambiguity of the
meaning of "person" in section 1983 from Monroe through Monell
he argued:
Indeed, it would seem to be an unwise use of judicial power, and inconsistent with the principles of
clear statement, to extrapolate from the tarnished
analysis of ambiguous statutory language in
Monroe and conclude that Congress has explicitly
determined to preempt the field of municipalliability when the result seriously restricts the remedies available to a court in constitutional adjudication. 8u

Next, the Ninth Circuit considered the doctrine of federalism. The court reasoned that if the federal judiciary creates a
federal cause of action to resolve disputes between individual
citizens and local governments, the "states and their political
subdivisions will likely be inhibited from seeking creative, efficatious resolutions to such disputes. "70 While this argument has
some merit, it is somewhat weakened by the number of federal
court decisions granting broad injunctive relief against municipalities, notably in the areas of school desegregation and prisoners' rights litigation. 71 Indeed, as Judge Grant reasoned in his
dissent, when considering the difficulties involved in holding individual municipal employees liable and the requirement of
"official policy" to hold municipalities liable under section 1983,
it would seem that municipal governments, not vicariously liable
under the Constitution, would have less incentive to create more
adequate hiring and training procedures to insure a reduction in
constitutional violations of its employees. 72
68. In his concurring opinion in Monell, Justice Powell expressed his belief that
municipal liability would be the same under § 1983 or the Constitution and that the better
reasoned approach would be to find liability under the statute rather than through extension of Bivens. "~ther than constitutionalize a cause of action against local government
that Congress intended to create in 1871, the better course is to confess error and set the
record straight, as the Court does today." [d. at 713.
69. 578 F.2d at 855.
70. [d. at 852.
71. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) and
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D.Cal. 1972).
72. 578 F.2d at 855 (Grant, D.J., dissenting).
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Finaliy, the court determined that section 1983 provides an
adequate remedy against municipal governments. In so doing, it
rejected both arguments of unwillingness of juries to hold individuals liable and deterrence of future wrongdoing as "speculative
at best. "73
G.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm the dismissal against
the city based on section 1983 was unreasonable due to the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Monell. The arguments by Molina were made without the benefit of the Supreme Court's radical
change in interpretation of municipal immunity under section
1983 and therefore, he should have been given the chance to reargue in light of Monell. In addition, while the court correctly
determined that an extension of the Bivens doctrine was discretionary, the prudential considerations in the court's analysis were
inadequate to justify the complete denial of a federal forum to
redress the constitutional wrongs of which Molina complained.
Had the court allowed Molina a chance to show that he had a
cause of action under section 1983, the decision not to extend
Bivens because section 1983 is adequate, may have been more
easily justified; but to say that he has an adequate remedy under
section 1983, and at the same time deny him the right to proceed
under the statute, is, at best, inconsistent. As Justice Black
stated in his opinion for the Court in Bell v. Hood: "And it is also
well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done."7.
Maxine Salzman
73. [d. at 853. Perhaps Molina is a clear example of the faulty nature of the court's
classification of these arguments as "speculative." Molina, allegedly for his failure to
remove his driver's license from a clear plastic container, was removed by force from his
automobile, handcuffed, taken to the police station and booked for resisting arrest. For
this incident, he was awarded by jury verdict a total of $131.50. [d. at 847. It seems hardly
likely that he was adequately compensated for his injuries.
74. 327 U.S. at 684.
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II. MANDATORY MATERNITY LEAVES UNDER TITLE
VII AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In 1872, the United States Supreme Court upheld a state
law denying women admission to the practice of law.' In a concurring opinion, Justice Bradley stated:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman
. . . . The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.2

One' hundred years later, in 1973, Karen deLaurier, a junior
high school language teacher, became pregnant. In deLaurier u.
San Diego Unified School District,3 she challenged the school
district's policy which required that she take a mandatory maternity leave of absence at the beginning of the ninth month of
pregnancy and denied her the use of accumulated sick leave benefits while on the mandatory leave. Her challenge was based
upon alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 4 and the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fifth a~d fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. The district court rejected the challenge, granting a summary judgment,
and upheld the school district's policy both as to the mandatory
leave and the denial of sick leave benefits.5 Regarding mandatory
1. Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. (Wall. 16) 130 (1872).
2. 1d. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
3. 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting, and Smith, D.J.).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's. . . sex. . . ; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex . . . .
5. 588 F.2d at 675.
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maternity leaves, the Ninth Circuit found a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII but affirmed the district court,
holding that the school district successfully raised the defense of
business necessity;8 the court rejected deLaurier's fourteenth
amendment arguments;7 and Judge Hudstedler filed a vigorous
dissent regarding the business necessity defense. 8
No one in the United States today will deny that women are
afforded substantially greater rights than at the time Justice
Bradley wrote his concurring opinion to Bradwell. However, legislation and litigation in the area of sex discrimination, and particularly with reference to pregnancy and employment, have provided a complicated and confusing patchwork of rules and tests.'
This Note will explore the existing guidelines under which Title
vn and fourteenth amendment sex discrimination claims are
brought, focusing on the Ninth Circuit's most recent application
of those guidelines in its deLaurier opinion.
B.

TITLE

vn AND MANDATORY MATERNITY LEAvn;

The United States Supreme Court has fashioned a threestep analysis to be used in determining whether an employer's
practices violate Title VII. to In McDonnell Douglas Corp. u.
6. [d. at 683. Regarding the sick leave policy, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the
denial of sick leave benefits discriminatory and remanding for further proceedings concerning the school district's defenses. This issue will not be discussed further because
subsequent legislation renders it moot. See notes 68 & 69 infra and accompanying text.
7. [d. at 684.
8. [d. at 685-92 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
9. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex classifications require intermediate level of scrutiny) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (four Justices
concluded in plurality opinion that sex classifications' require strict scrutiny). See also
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (pregnancy classification not gender-based discrimination). Justice Stevens commented on the confusing nature of existing law in his
concurring opinion in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977):
The general problem is to decide when a company policy
which attaches a special burden to the risk of absenteeism
caused by pregnancy is a prima facie violation of the statutory
prohibition against sex discrimination. The answer "always,"
which I had thought quite plainly correct, is foreclosed by the
Court's holding in Gilbert. The answer "never" would seem to
be dictated by the Court's view that a discrimination against
pregnancy in "not a gender-based discrimination at all." The
Court has, however, made it clear that the correct answer is
"sometimes. "
[d. at 153-54 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
10. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 434 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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Green,1I the Court first articulated its three-step test to clarify
the confusion lower courts were experiencing in the placement of
burdens of proof in a Title vn case"!
The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Powell, carefully outlined the three steps necessary to determine
whether the employer has in fact violated the statute. First, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. IS
Once this is established, the defendant is given the opportunity
to rebut the prima facie case by showing "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."14 This, however, is not the end of the inquiry. The third step requires that
although a prima facie case of discrimination may be successfully rebutted by· some articulated, nondiscriminatory reason,
the plaintiff must then be given "a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively
valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision. "15

The Prima Facie Case
Until 1974, a classification made on the basis of pregnancy
was probably assumed to be a distinction made on the basis of
sex. However, in that year the United States Supreme Court decided Geduldig v. Aiello l8 and declared that such a classification
is not gender-basedY In its often-quoted footnote 20, the majority opinion stated, "[t]he program divides potential recipients
11. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell case involved a black former employee of
the aerospace manufacturer who, after having been laid off after eight years of employment, actively and unlawfully protested the allegedly racial motivation of the employer's
general hiring practices and his own discharge. Shortly thereafter, the employer advertised a position for which Green qualified. He applied and was rejected due to his unlawful protests against the corporation. [d. at 794-96. Green then made a timely claim with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and eventually brought suit in
the district court charging Title VII violations. [d. at 796-98.
12. [d. at 801.
13. [d. at 802.
14. [d. This second step, often referred to as the business necessity defense, has been
articulated by the Court in varying degrees of proof required to rebut the prima facie
case. The quoted phrase in McDonnell is rather broad, presumably in deference to the
employer who was subjected to illegal, disruptive protests by the plaintiff. In other cases,
the articulated standard is more restrictive. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
15. 411 U.S. at 805.
16. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
17. [d. at 496-97 n.20.
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into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.
While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes
members of both sexes. illS

Geduldig involved an equal protection challenge by a pregnant woman to California's state disability insurance program
which provided benefits to private employees for temporary disabilities not covered by workmen's compensation. The program
excluded normal pregnancy and childbirth from its definition of
eligible disabilities. Although the Court found that the state had
legitimate interests in excluding pregnancy and childbirth, notably cost, the determination that the program was valid was
based on the fact that the exclusion was not an invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause. lu The
Court reasoned that the program, as it stood, protected men and
women equally, and the denial of an additional benefit to women
was, therefore, not discriminatory.2o
Two years later, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,21 the
Court was confronted with a Title VII challenge to an almost
identical disability program provided by a private employer. Following its reasoning in Geduldig, the Gilbert Court found that
where men and women are entitled to the same benefits, the denial of an additional benefit to women for pregnancy-related disabilities was not gender-based discrimination in violation of Title VII.22 From Gilbert it would be logical to assume that
distinctions made on the basis of pregnancy-although clearly
affecting only females-are not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title vn.23
However, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,24 the Court distinguished Gilbert and invalidated an employer's policy which violated Title vn by its discriminatory effect on pregnant women.25
18. [d.
19. [d. at 496-97 n.20.
20. [d. at 496-97.

21. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
22. [d. at 136.
23. See Justice Stevens' comment at note 7 supra. Although Gilbert was a Title VII
case and Geduldig was based on the equal protection clause. a challenge on due process
grounds relating to pregnancy was successful in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur. 414
U.S. 632 (1974).
24. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
25. [d. at 142.
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The challenged policy required that pregnant employees take a
formal leave of absence during which the employee received no
sick pay and also lost all accumulated job seniority.28 In reference to the seniority issue, the Sa tty Court reasoned that, unlike
the "additional benefit" in Gilbert, this program imposed an additional burden on women that men do not suffer,27 thereby violating Title VII.28

It is clear from Geduldig, Gilbert, and Satty that in order to
make •out a prima facie case of sex discrimination regarding
pregnancy-related classifications, the plaintiff must show that
the challenged policy imposes an additional burden upon women
which men need not suffer, rather than that it denies an additional benefit which men need not receive. 29
Business Necessity

In Griggs v. Duke Power CO.,30 black employees challenged
the defendant employer's requirement of a high school diploma
or the passing of a standardized intelligence test (unrelated to
job performance) as a condition of employment or transfer as racial discrimination in violation of Title VIT.31 Tile district court
found, and the court of appeals agreed, that although the company had been guilty of racial discrimination in the past, there
was no intent or purpose to discriminate in the company's enactment of this policy which, therefore, did not violate the statute. 32
26. [d. at 137.
27. [d. at 142.
28. The Court remanded on the issue of sick leave benefits, finding the policy to be
neutral on its face, for a determination of whether the policy had a discriminatory effect.
[d. at 145-46.
29. On October 31, 1978 Congress amended Title VII overruling the holding in Gilbert. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978) was added, providing in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include,
but are not limited to, because or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected
by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or unability to work.
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
31. [d. at 425-26.
32. [d. at 428-30. The policy resulted in a disproportionate number of blacks being
ineligible for employment or transfer. [d. at 429. The Court cited statistics for North
Carolina from the 1960 census which indicated that 34% of white males and 12% of black
males had completed high school. Even greater disparity was evidenced by an EEOC
study of standardized tests such as those used by Duke Power. [d. at 430 n.6.
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In reversing, the Supreme Court held that, even assuming the
practice to be neutral both on its face and in its intent, if its
effect is discriminatory it will fail unless the employer can show
"a manifest relationship to the employment in question."3s Chief
Justice Burger declared for a unanimous Court34 that "[t]he
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited. "35
Since Griggs, the "business necessity" or "job-relatedness"
defense has been considered in Title vn cases involving a broad
spectrum of situations, other than standardized tests and diploma requirements. 3u However, the standard as enunciated by
the Griggs Court to be used in determining the validity of a discriminatory employment practice is strict. "What Congress commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the
job and not the person in the abstract."37
The third step of the McDonnell analysis-plaintiff's rebuttal of the business necessity defense-had its genesis in the language of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,38 where the Court stated
that a policy which is neutral on its face may nonetheless be prohibited if it is merely a pretext or subterfuge to "accomplish a
forbidden discrimination, "su such as might easily be inferred
from the facts of Griggs.40 In Dothard v. Rawlinson,41 the Supreme Court was faced with a Title vn attack upon Alabama's·
height and weight requirements for employment as prison guards
which allegedly disqualified a disproportionate number of wo33. [d. at 432.
34. All Justices joined in the Chief Justice's opinion except Justice Brennan, who
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
35. [d. at 43l.
36. See, e.g., Nashvi1le Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (loss of seniority benefits during forced pregnancy leave held invalid); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (height and· weight requirements for prison guards held invalid); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (refusal to rehire civil rights activist).
37. 401 U.S. at 436.
38. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
39. [d. at 136.
40. Duke Power actively discriminated against blacks prior to the effective date of
Title VII (July 2, 1965) at which time the company no longer required blacks to remain
in the lowest-paying jobs. But, at the same time, the employer instituted the challenged
diploma and test requirements. These requirements, although applied equally to all employees, resulted in continued discrimination. 401 U.S. at 426-28.
4l. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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men applicants,42 The Dothard Court emphasized that the availability of less discriminatory alternatives which satisfy the legitimate interests of the employer (business necessity) could
sufficiently rebut that defense,4s

C.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND MANDATORY MATERNITY

LEAVES

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has
been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to protect
an individual's freedom of choice regarding marriage and procreation against unwarranted governmental intrusion. 44 Restrictions
placed upon pregnant employees, such as mandatory leaves of
absence and denial of sick pay, obviously intrude in some way
upon a woman's fundamental right to choose to bear a child.
The issue of when such restrictions are sufficiently antagonistic
to the woman's freedom of choice to be prohibited by the Constitution was addressed by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur. 45
In LaFleur, two pregnant teachers challenged a policy of the
school board which required any teacher who became pregnant
to take a mandatory maternity leave of absence, without pay, no
later than five months prior to the expected date of birth of the
child. 48 The school board advanced two interests allegedly served
by the mandatory maternity.leave: (1) continuity of classroom
instruction requires a firm cut-off date to aid the school board in
finding and hiring qualified substitutes; and (2) the physical inability of some teachers in the more advanced stages of pregnancy to adequately perform their duties requires an early cutoff date to protect the quality of instruction, as well as the
health of the woman and her child. 41 The Court struck down the
mandatory maternity leave policy as violative of the due process
clause, notwithstanding the validity of the asserted interests,48

•
42. [d. at 323-28.
43. [d. at 329.
44. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1945).
.
45. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
46. [d. at 635.
47. [d. at 640-41.
48. [d. at 639-48.
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The Court found continuity of ciassroom instruction to be a
legitimate interest,48 but the mandatory leave policy of the
school board did nothing to serve this interest because only two
weeks' notice was required by the policy, not giving the board
much time to find a qualified substitute. Also, a cut-off date
much later in pregnancy would certainly give the board a greater
opportunity to find replacements with sufficient advance notice. 5O The Court held the early cut-off date to be wholly arbitrary, bearing no rational relationship to the interest of continuity of instruction. 51
The Court also found the second reason asserted by the
school board, the pregnant teacher's physical incapacities, to be
a legitimate interest in the protection of both the teacher's
health and the quality of instruction. 52 However, the Supreme
Court held that the mandatory leave rules amounted to an impermissible irrebuttable presumption, in violation of due process, that all pregnant teachers are incapable of continuing to
work after the fourth month of pregnancy.53 Thus, the LaFleur
Court enunciated two alternative tests to determine whether the
mandatory leave rules violate due process: (1) "the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that such rules
must not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon
this vital area of a teacher's Constitutional libertY,"54 or (2) if
the rule creates an irrebuttable presumption which is neither
necessarily nor universally true, it violates the due process
clause. 55
Justice Powell concurred in the result reached by the Court
in LaFleur but felt that an equal protection, rather than due
process, analysis was appropriate. 58 Without deciding whether
the regulations of the school board constituted sex or disability
classifications, or whether a sex-based classification would re-

•
49. [d. at 641.
50. [d. at 642-43.
51. [d. at 643. "In fact, since the fifth ... month of pregnancy will obviously begin

at different times in the school year for different teachers, the present. . . rules serve to
hinder attaipment of the very continuity objectives that they are purportedly designed to
promote." [d.
52. [d. at 643-44.
53. [d. at 644-45.
54. [d. at 640.
55. [d. at 646.
56. [d. at 651 (Powell, J., concurring).
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quire strict scrutiny, Justice Powell found that the challenged
rules did not meet even a rational basis test. 57 Although the
school board did articulate legitimate state interests, Justice
Powell agreed with the Court in concluding that there was no
showing that these interests were rationally furthered by the
challenged rules. 58

It is important to note that LaFleur arose prior to the Title
VII amendment extending the reach of the statute to include
state agencies and educational institutions. 58 Although a majority of the Supreme Court has not yet declared sex to be a suspect
classification subject to strict scrutiny, 80 and it is not clear that
rules relating to pregnancy necessarily involve sex-based classifications,61 Title VII appears to require an analysis comparable to
the traditional strict scrutiny equal protection analysis. 82 In addition, the statute, as amended in 1978, declares that classifications made on the basis of pregnancy are, for purposes of the
statute, classifications made on the basis of sex. 83
D. THE deLaurier Opinion
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion of deLaurier's claims
with an analysis of the school district's policy of mandatory
leave of absence under Title VII. The court agreed that a prima
57.
58.
59.
60.

[d. at 653 n.2.
[d.
[d. at 656 n.6.
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate level of scrutiny for

sex classifications); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (four Justices concluded
in the plurality opinion that classifications on the basis of sex are suspect).
61. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (not gender-based discrimination); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 653 n.2 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring, stating that the issue need not be decided).
62. A strict scrutiny analysis under the equal protection clause typically requires a
determination that 1) the challenged policy burdens a suspect class or infringes upon a
fundamental right; 2) once this is determined, the policy is presumed to be' unconstitutional unless the government can show a compelling interest; and 3) the policy must
constitute the least restrictive means available. H. CHASE AND C. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 62 (2d ed. 1979).
A Title VII analysis similarly involves 1) a determination that the classification
made by the challenged policy is prohibited by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, for example, makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2) The employer is then given the opportunity to
show that the policy is required as a business necessity. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. at 431. 3) The policy may still be prohibited by Title vn if less discriminatory
alternatives are available. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 329.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978). See note 29 supra.
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facie case of discrimination was presented84 and concluded that
the district court findings regarding business necessity were not
clearly erroneous. eo The court then distinguished the challenged
leave policy from that of Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur 88 and found that the policy was neither arbitrary nor did it
constitute an impermissible irrebuttable presumption in violation of the due process clause. 87 Finally, the court determined
that the denial of accumulated sick leave benefits showed a
prima facie case of discrimination under Title VIl88 and remanded that issue to the district court to provide the school district with an opportunity to show business necessity in defense of
its policy. 88
Title VII Claim

The Ninth Circuit had no difficulty finding that since
"mandatory maternity leave is not the withholding of a potential
benefit, but is a restriction on pregnant women's employment
opportunities, it follows that such a policy does constitute a gender-based discrimination."70 Following the "additional burden"
analysis of Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 71 as opposed to a finding of
"additional benefit" of Geduldig v. Aiello72 and General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert,73 the deLaurier court agreed that the policy was a
prima facie violation of Title VIT, and proceeded to discuss the
defense of business necessity presented by the school district.
The district court found the mandatory leave policy to be
justifiable as a business necessity.74 In its findings of fact, the
64. 588 F.2d at 676.
65. [d. at 681.

66. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
67. 588 F.2d at 682-83.
68. [d. at 684.
69. [d. at 685. Recent amendments, not applicable to deLaurier, to Title VII and
California Education Code render unnecessary further discussion of the issue of sick leave
benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (relevant text is reproduced at note 29 supra) was added to
Title VII on October 31, 1978 and effectively overruled Gilbert by declaring that pregnancy shall be treated, for all employment purposes, the same as other disabilities. In
addition, while deLaurier was pending appeal, the California legislature amended the
Education Code to the effect that sick leave benefits may be used during pregnancy
leave. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44978 (West 1976).
70. 588 F.2d at 677.
71. 434 U.S. at 351.
72. 417 U.S. 484.
73. 429 U.S. 125.
74. 588 F.2d at 678.
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district court had enumerated four reasons for upholding the necessity of the policy: (1) health of the mother and child; (2) declining ability to perform; (3) the need for qualified substitutes;
and (4) the need for sufficient lead time to find qualified substitutes and a date certain for such substitutes to commence employment. 75 The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court
had applied the correct legal standard regarding the business necessity defense, and restricted further analysis to the issue of
whether the findings were clearly erroneous. 78
The Ninth Circuit divided the district court's findings into
two groups and determined that the business necessity defense
was supported alternatively by the first set of goals, relating to
administrative and educational needs,77 or the second, relating to
the physical condition of the teacher. 78 The deLaurier court did
not correctly apply the standards set out by the Supreme Court
in Griggs1t and Do thard ,80 in that no showing was made that any
of the valid goals presented by the school district were furthered
by the mandatory leave policy. As Judge Hufstedler pointed out
in a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, although the
business necessity defense is available in a broad range of Title
vn cases, the defense is difficult to establish and
is a highly restrictive and carefully limited defense . . . . The defense cannot be established
merely by a showing that it is administratively
convenient to the employer, or even by a showing
that other practices would be highly inconvenient.
The employer must show that the practice in
question is specifically required for the operation
of the business. sl

Specifically, the school district offered no evidence either to show
that the mandatory maternity leave commencing at the beginning of the ninth month of pregnancy was required to further the
goals of finding qualified substitute teachers and protecting the
75. 1d. at 678·79 n.8.
76. 1d. at 679.

77. 1d. at 680.
78.1d.
79. 401 U.S. at 436. The policy must "measure the person for the job."
BO. 433 U.S. at 332 n.14. The policy must be "necessary to safe and efficient job
performance."
81. 588 F.2d at 687 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
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health of the mother and child or that teachers who were nine
months pregnant could not adequately perform their duties. 82
Regarding the administrative goals, it is obviously convenient to
have a date certain in order to hire a substitute for the pregnant
teacher. It is equally convenient to have a date certain in order
to hire a substitute for any other teacher who must take an extended leave of absence. Yet, according to the school district's
policy, only pregnant teachers were required to give advance notification. There was no showing that there was a need for such
disparate treatment, and further, there was no showing that the
administrative goals would not have been served equally well by
allowing the individual teacher to determine at what date her
leave would begin, as long as sufficient advance notice were
given. 83
The court relied on medical testimony, which indicated that
it is impossible to accurately predict the date a child will be
born, to uphold the district's ninth-month rule as necessary to
further the administrative goal of having a date certain. 84 However, Judge Hufstedler, in her dissent, broke down the statistical
evidence as presented by the medical experts and found that in
the year in which Karen deLaurier was pregnant only one or two
pregnant teachers in the San Diego school district who desired to
teach later than the beginning of the ninth month of pregnancy
"would be likely to give birth before one week prior to their predicted delivery date."85 This set of facts could hardly justify the
requirement that all pregnant teachers must take a mandatory
leave of absence four weeks prior to the earliest expected delivery
date as a business necessity.
The deLaurier court found that the leave policy could alternatively be upheld as a business necessity due to the physical
condition of pregnant teachers during the ninth month. 88 Again,
there was no showing that teachers in the ninth month of pregnancy are unable to perform their duties or that unusual complications of pregnancy are more likely to occur in the ninth month
82. [d. at 688.
83. [d. Indeed, the California legislature has amended the Education Code so that

the decision as to when maternity leave should commence is now to be made by the
individual teacher and her physician. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44965 (West 1976).
84. 588 F.2d at 680.
85. [d. at 688.
86. [d. at 680.
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than at earlier stages of pregnancy. Nor was there any evidence
that complications were more likely to occur among women who
continued teaching than pregnant women generally.87 As Judge
Hufstedler correctly concluded, the district court's findings regarding the physical condition of the teacher were clearly
erroneous. 88
Even assuming that the school district's policy was justified,
either by its need for a date certain or its concern for the health
of mother and child, the evidence presented in deLaurier showed
that a less restrictive alternative-the third step of the McDonnelllDothard test-was available. Nothing in the evidence, as
disclosed by the opinions of Judges Wallace or Hufstedler,
showed that a cut-off date one week prior to the expected delivery or any other date chosen by the individual teacher and her
physician would not further the legitimate interests of the school
district. Thus, the deLaurier court failed to apply the correct
standard by disregarding the third step to rebut the business necessity defense.
The Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Relying on dicta of the Supreme Court's opinion in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,88 the Ninth Circuit held
that the school district's mandatory ninth-month leave policy
was neither arbitrary nor grounded upon an impermissible irrebuttable presumption. so The Ninth Circuit distinguished LaFleur on the basis of medical testimony regarding the inaccuracy
of prediction of the expected delivery date 81 and found that "it is
wholly rational for the district to terminate the teacher's freedom of choice at just that point where the unpredictability of
pregnancy is most likely to come into play."82 However, in discussing the same interests of continuity of education and administrative convenience as those asserted in deLaurier, the LaFleur
Court noted: "Indeed, continuity would seem just as well attained if the teacher herself were allowed to choose the date
87. [d. at 689.
88. [d. at 690.

89. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
90. 588 F.2d at 683. The LaFleur Court found that the policy before it, which required the leave of absence to begin at the fifth month of pregnancy, was arbitrary and
wholly unrelated to the interests asserted by the school district. 414 U.S. at 639-43.
91. See text accompanying notes 84 and 85 supra.
92. 588 F.2d at 682.
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upon which to commence her leave, at least so long as the decision were required to be made and notice given of it well in advance of the date selected.",a The LaFleur Court, addressing the
problem of unpredictability, implied that any mandatory cut-off
date treating maternity unlike other disabilities might violate
due process.
It is, of course, possible that either premature
childbirth or complications in the latter stages of
pregnancy might upset even the most careful
plans of the teacher, the substitute, and the
school board. But there is nothing in these records
to indicate that such emergencies could not be
handled, as are all others, through the normal use
of the emergency substitute teacher process. v•

In short, although the challenged policy in de Laurier was
not as restrictive as the policy held to violate due process in LaFleur, the asserted interests and the restrictions placed upon
pregnant teachers in both cases are sufficiently similar to conclude that, according to the Supreme Court's reasoning, both
policies are equally violative of due process.

E.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the Title VII challenge to the
mandatory leave policy was incomplete. The court considered
the first step required by McDonnell and found a prima facie
case of discrimination. The coUrt then determined that the second step of the McDonnell test was met. In so doing, the court
did not correctly analyze the business necessity defense. It failed
to show any correlation between the admittedly valid interests
asserted by the school district and the policy established to further those interests. Then, the court failed to consider less restrictive alternatives to the challenged policy, as required by McDonnell and Dothard to rebut the business necessity defense.
Because of the recent amendments to the California Education
Code, the deLaurier decision is not likely to have any serious effect on pregnant teachers in California. However, since Title VII
reaches many more situations of employment discrimination
than mandatory maternity leaves for teachers, the flawed reason93. 414 U.S. at 642.
94. 1d. at 642 n.lO (citation omitted).
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ing of the court may adversely affect women in other jobs, and
any workers with a Title vn dispute in the Ninth Circuit.
Maxine Salzman

.m.
A.

TITLE

vn RIGHTS

OF HOMOSEXUALS

INTRODUCTION

In DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., Inc., I
the Ninth Circuit firmly shut the door to potential Title vn2 and
Section 1985(3)3 protections for homosexuals. In this case plaintiffs consolidated three appeals and alleged that their respective
employers discriminated against them in employment decisions
because of their homosexuality} In two cases plaintiffs had filed
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. May, 1979) (per Choy, J.; Sneed, J., filed a concurring and
dissenting opinion; Bonsai, D.J., was the third panel member).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) provides
in pertinent part:
It sha1\ be unlawful employment practice for an employer ...
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of
such individual's ... sex.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976) states in pertinent part:
If two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privilege
and immunities under the law ... the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against anyone or more
of the conspirators.
4. Plaintiffs brought this appeal to the Ninth Circuit through a consolidation of three
cases:
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc.: three homosexuals a1\eged impermissible
discrimination; one claimed that he was not hired because a PT&T supervisor concluded
that he was a homosexual and the other two claimed they were forced to quit their
employment after being harassed by fe1\ow workers and their supervisors. Plaintiffs filed
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which were rejected for lack of jurisdiction over claims of discrimination because of sexual orientation.
Plaintiffs then sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief under Title VII and
§ 1985(c), as we1\ as mandamus instructing the EEOC to process charges based upon sexual orientation.
Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery School, Inc.: a male homosexual a1\eged discrimination when he was fired after two years of service as a teacher because he wore a sma1\ gold
ear loop to school. Plaintiff filed charges with the EEOC which were rejected I,Ind sought
declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief.
Lundin v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc.: two female homosexuals claimed they were
fired due to their known lesbian relationship. Plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive
relief.
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(EEOC) which were rejected for lack of jurisdiction over claims
of discrimination due to sexual orientation. In all three cases
plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The
district courts in each case dismissed the complaints for failure
to state a cause of actionS under the statutes.

B.

TITLE

vn CLAIM-CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Plaintiffs claimed that Title VII should be interpreted to
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of a person's
sexual orientation. They argued that Congress, in formulating
Title VII to prohibit sex discrimination in employment decisions,
intended to include protection for sexual preferences as well as
protection from gender-based discrimination. Plaintiffs contended that the district courts erred in dismissing their complaints for failing to state claims under the statute. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, thereby rejecting plaintiffs' argument that Title
VII protections include sexual preference.
The court relied upon its earlier holding in Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & CO.,8 in which the Ninth Circuit held that Title
vn protections do not extend to transsexuals. In Holloway, the
court found that Congress had not shown any intent to extend the
term "sex" to other than its traditional meaning of gender. The
court found that the sex discrimination provisions of the statute
were limited and were only intended "to place women on an equal
footing with men."7 The court also noted that Congress, in subsequent legislative sessions, failed to adopt proposed amendments
concerning sexual preference, making this refusal to broaden the
term "sex" evident. s Based upon the findings of Holloway, the
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5) allows dismissal upon motion that the pleadings fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs were, therefore, foreclosed from
proving their case upon the merits.
6. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). See Note, Title VII Rights of Transsexuals, Ninth
Circuit Survey, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 100 (1979).
7. 566 F.2d at 662. The court in Holloway stated:
Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the
term "sex" to its traditional meaning. Therefore, this court will
not expand Title VII's application in the absence of Congressional mandate. The manifest purpose of Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination in employment is to ensure that men
and women are treated equally, absent a bona fide relationship
between the qualifications for the job and the person's sex.
[d. at 663.
8. [d. at 662. These three bills were: H.R. 5452, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.
2667, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 121 CONGo REc.
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Ninth Circuit concluded "that Title VII's prohibition of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender
and should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality."8
The court further used this denial of Title VII protections to
dismiss additional claims. One claim involved being fired due to
effeminacy, the employer relying upon a stereotype that male
teachers should have a virile appearance. IO Another claim alleged
an impermissible interference with employees' rights of association due to discrimination against employees having homosexual
relationships with certain friends. II Both claims were found lacking due to the absence of protection afforded to homosexuals by
Title VII.
Similarly, the court rejected the allegation that discrimination based upon sexual preference repreE!ents impermissible use
of different employment criteria for men and women as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 12
An employer using such a policy, reasoned the Ninth Circuit,
whether dealing with men or women is using the same criterion,
namely, the preference of an employee for sexual partners of the
same sex.
Disproportionate Impact

Plaintiffs also argued that homosexual discrimination falls
within Title VII protections based upon recent decisions concerning disproportionate impact of facially neutral criteria. 13 Under
8548 (1975). (remarks of Mr. Koch). See Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Center, 403
F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimination in
Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 495, 502-03 (1976).
9. 608 F.2d at 331-32.
10. The court rejected plaintiffs contention that being fired due to an effeminate
appearance violated Title VII. [d. at 332. Relying upon the Holloway finding of protection
only for gender-based discrimination, the DeSantis panel agreed with the Fifth Circuit
holding that discrimination because of effeminacy is not protected by Title VII. [d.,
citing Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
11. Plaintiffs sought to draw an analogy to holdings ofthe EEOC that discrimination
due to the race of employees' friends may constitute a violation of Title VII. See EEOC
Dec. No. 71-1902, [1973] EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) ~6281; EEOC Dec. No. 71-969,
[1972] EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) ~6193. The allegation was rejected due to the holding
that homosexual relationships are not protected under Title VII.
12. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
13. Facially neutral actions (actions not discriminatory in form) may produce effects
that adversely and disproportionately weigh upon members of particular protected groups
of individuals. Such actions will require explanation in terms of non-invidious purposes.
This theory of facially neutral discrimination has been developed by the United States
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cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 14 discrimination against
homosexuals could be proven in trial to have a disproportionate
effect upon men, thus making it an impermissible classification
affecting one sex more than the other .15 Plaintiffs claimed this
disproportionate impact upon men results from the greater incidence of homosexuality amongst men and the greater likelihood of
discovering a male's homosexuality as compared to a female's
homosexuality.
A majority of the court rejected this extension of Title VII
through a disproportionate impact analysis. 1ft The DeSantis majority contended that the Supreme Court in Griggs sought to
effectuate the major congressional purpose of Title VII of protecting blacks from employment discrimination. Since Congress repeatedly refused to adopt legislation to extend such protection to
sexual orientation, the majority refused "to 'bootstrap' Title VII
protection to homosexuals under the guise of protecting men generally. "17
Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976). See Note, Discrimination: Facially
Neutral Action, Ninth Circuit Survey, 10 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 60 (1980).
14. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
15. Plaintiffs quoted from Griggs: "What is required by Congress (under Title VII)
is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classifications." 401 U.S. at 431.
16. But see Blake v. Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) where the Ninth
Circuit found that Title VII could be utilized under a Griggs impact analysis to show a
violation of sex discrimination in employment by a public employer in a case involving
alleged discrimination against women by the Los Angeles Police Department. The court
held that Congress expressly provided that Title vn was to apply to state and local
governments and intended that the Griggs impact standard would apply through a mere
showing of disproportionate impact on a protected group. Invidious intent need not be
shown. The disproportionate impact of different height and weight requirements on
women was found to be sufficient to make a prima facie showing of sex discrimination, as
was the total exclusion of women from regular patrol work. Once this showing is made,
the employer must meet a burden of justifying the employment practice. The defendant
failed to show sufficient business necessity in following its discriminatory policies. The
case was remanded to the district court for trial, overturning the lower court decision of
summary judgment for defendants.
17. 608 F.2d at 331. The dissent differed on the matter of Griggs disproportionate
impact theory. Although the dissent agreed that Title VII does not extend protection from
employment discrimination to homosexuals, the dissent would have allowed plaintiffs to
try their case on the merits and not dismiss this issue on the pleadings.
The dissent interpreted the issue raised to be that homosexuality represents a facially
neutral criterion that may impact disproportionately on males due to the greater visibility
of male homosexuals and higher incidence of male homosexuality. The use of such a claim
is not just an attempt to "bootstrap" Title VII protection to homosexuals, but rather, is
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THE SECTION 1985 CLAIM

Plaintiffs claimed that defendants engaged in a conspiracy
in violation of section 1985(c)18 to deny them equal protection of
the law through concerted actions by various agents of their employers to effectuate discriminatory policies against homosexuals.
The court, however, in support of its holding that section 1985(c)
is inapplicable to homosexual discrimination claims, relied upon
Griffin u. Breckenridge,19 which held that there must be "some
racial or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus behind conspirator's action."20 Since homosexuality
is not a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classification, terms which
have been applied to race and gender to require more exacting
scrutiny, the court reasoned that homosexuals are not within the
ambit of section 1985(c).
D. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO TITLE

vn PROTECTION

It is clear that protections from employment discrimination
due to sexual preference will not be extended by the Ninth Circuit
based on congressional intent in enacting Title VII. Although
DeSantis and Holloway were not unanimous decisions, all members of the respective panels agreed that the intent of Title vn
was to limit protection from sex-based employment discrimination to gender. Support for this holding exists in one other circuit
at this time. 21 Additionally, commentators have also noted the
lack of intent by Congress to ban employment discrimination
based on homosexuality through Title vn. 22

This holding is essentially the only interpretation possible of
a claim that may be ·shown to· protect men in general. [d. at 333.
18. For the relevant statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), see note 3 supra.
19. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
20. [d. at 102.
21. The Fifth Circuit has also held in Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325
(5th Cir. 1978) that Title VII does not protect homosexuals, thus refusing, as the Ninth
Circuit has in DeSantis, to extend the prohibition of sexual discrimination without Congressional mandate.
22. As noted in Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1979), Congress,
in discussing the Title VII provision relating to sex, religion and national origin discrimination did not entertain the notion that the statute might be raised in subsequent sexual
preference discrimination cases. The author comments: "[AJny forthright analysis must
recognize that most of the alternative approaches are simply efforts at ascertaining what
Congress would, or should, have said with respect to sexual preference classifications had
it confronted that subject." [d. at 564. See also Siniscalco, supra note 8.
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Congressional intent in enacting Title VII. It is clear that Title
vn was intended to be limited in application to discrimination
due to "sex" in its traditional meaning, that is, to gender-based
discrimination. To extend protections from Title VII, as plaintiffs
suggest, would be clearly an exercise in judicial legislation. The
proper forum for such attempts to produce statutory protections
is with Congress and not the judiciary.
The dissent 23 recognized a possible means for protecting
against sexual preference employment discrimination. Under a
theory of disproportionate impact against men as a class, a facially neutral criterion might result in a violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 24 The court may
have been too hasty in dismissing, out of hand, the issue of facially neutral discrimination. Plaintiffs should, as the dissent
suggested, be allowed to show discrimination against men as a
class as a result of homosexual discrimination. In this developing
area of equal protection law, by deciding this case on the merits
upon a disproportionate impact theory, the Ninth Circuit would
have taken a step in determining the extent to which remedies
exist for discrimination against a gender-class from discrimination which stems from characteristics of individuals within that
class.
Another means of establishing such protection in private
employment would be to extend those protections now existing
within the public sector25 by establishing the employer as "quasigovernmental."28 Also, one might attempt to classify the activity
23. See note 17 supra.

24. To prevail on a cause of action based on disproportionate impact requires a
showing that males are discriminated against to the benefit of females due to the facially
neutral criterion of homosexuality. Just as Griggs effectuated the congressional purpose
of Title VII in protecting blacks from employment discrimination, the intent of protecting
men as a class may be extended here. In this way it would be necessary to satisfy at least
the intermediate level of scrutiny afforded to gender which would require meeting a
substantial relationship test. Although it may be difficult to show, plaintiffs could point
to factors such as greater statistical incidence of male homosexuality, greater likelihood
of discovering a male's homosexual preference due to official documentation in military
and arrest records, and the greater stigma associated with male as compared to female
homosexuality.
25. See Friedman, supra note 22.
26. The California Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, granted equal protection guarantees of freedom from employment discrimination to homosexuals employed by
public utilities. Gay Law Students Ass'n. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595
P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979). The California court drew an analogy between public
utilities and governmental entities because of their exclusive monopolistic franchises
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of the employer as "state action"27 under the fourteenth amendment where a relationship exists between the private employer
and government through funding, government contracts, or srmilar ties. In this way, where a substantial relationship between a
private employer and the government is shown, the discriminatory action would have to survive rational basis scrutiny or be
found unconstitutional. Although this level of scrutiny is relatively easy to satisfy, in the event that intermediate or strict level
of scrutiny would be found to apply to homosexuals, this means
of analysis may partially extend public sector protections into the
private sector.

E.

CONCLUSION

The establishment of protection from employment discrimination for homosexuals will necessarily come from furtherance of
constitutional protections or legislation which explicitly covers
discrimination against homosexuals. DeSantis foreclosed any attempts to extend these protections from Title VII.
Wayne B. Chew
granted and protected by the state. There is no "state action" requirement in the California Constitution, which reads in pertinent part: "A person may not be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws." CAL.
CONST., Art. I, Sec. 7, sub. (a). Thus, the California court could extend to public utilities
the obligation not to employ arbitrary employment discrimination against any class of
individuals. Since the state may not exclude homosexuals as a class from employment
opportunities without a showing that a person's homosexuality renders that person unfit
for the job, Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375,82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969),
this decision places public utilities under this obligation as well.
The California Supreme Court held that protection from homosexual employment
discrimination was afforded by statutes also. CAL. PUB. UTlL. CODE § 453 (West Supp.
1979) was found to ban arbitrary employment discrimination against homosexuals by a
public utility and CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101 and 1102 (West Supp. 1979) were held to protect
homosexuals from employment discrimination due to their "political activity." 24 Cal. 3d
458, 475-89, 595 P.2d 592, 602-11, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 24-33.
27. Such state action may be alleged through a) assumption of state functions or
powers by a private party, b) state aid to privately initiated activity, c) a partnership or
agency relationship between private parties and state, and d) private party action subject
to state regulatory schemes. See generally, McCoy, Current State Action Theories, the
Jackson Nexus Requirement, and Employee Discharges by Semi-Public and State-Aided
Institutions, 31 VAND. L. REV. 785 (1978); Nevin, State Action: The Significant State
Inuoluement Doctrine after Moose Lodge and Jackson, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 647 (1978); Note,
State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Priuate Actiuity, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

33

60

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 7

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:27

IV. DISCRIMINATION: FACIALLY NEUTRAL ACTION

A.

INTRODUCTION

In a potentially far-reaching decision, the Ninth Circuit in
De La Cruz v. Tormey, I reversed a dismissal upon the complaint
of an action concerning the lack of campus child care facilities in
a community college district. The plaintiffs, young women with
low incomes, faced with burdens of child rearing, alleged that the
continued denial of child care facilities by the community college
district deprived them of equal educational opportunity.2 The
district court dismissed the entire complaint on the ground that
it failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted on
a motion by the defendants: the Board of Trustees, the Chancellor, and the Presidents of the three colleges comprising the San
Mateo Community College District. The question before the
Ninth Circuit was the sufficiency of the pleadings for a trial upon
the merits. 3
The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had stated a
claim of discrimination entitling them to an opportunity to demonstrate proof of their allegations. In remanding the case to the
district court, the Ninth Circuit expressed no views concerning
the merits of the claims made, deciding only that the case could
not be resolved upon construction of the pleadings.
De La Cruz presented the Ninth Circuit with two significant
issues: the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint under both
Title IX and the fourteenth amendment, and their standing to
sue. The plaintiffs' claimed a violation under Title IX of the
1. 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. Sept. 1978) (per Palmieri, D.J., sitting by designation; Wallace, J., dissenting; the other panel member was Kilkenny, J.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
965 (1979).
2. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that defendants acted illegally and unconstitutionally, and temporary and permanent injunctions restraining defendants from
maintaining their allegedly discriminatory "anti-child-care" policy and requiring them to
take affirmative steps to develop child care centers in the Community College District.
3. In stating the issue and outlining the task before it, the court stated:
The issue is not whether a plaintiffs success on the merits is
likely but rather whether the claimant is entitled to proceed
beyond the threRhold in attempting to establish his
claims . . . . We must determine whether or not it appears to
a certainty under existing law that no relief can be granted
under any set of facts that might be proved in support of plaintiffs claims.
582 F.2d at 48.
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Education Act Amendments of 1972.· They alleged an infringe. ment of their rights to be free from sexual discrimination in educational programs receiving federal funds. Plaintiffs also claimed
that the defendants' actions constituted intentional, invidious
gender-based discrimination which was arbitrary and totally unrelated to the legitimate goal of providing education, thus violating their rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the Community
College District arbitrarily maintained a policy of refusing to
allow the establishment of child care centers, refusing to expend
District funds or accept or apply for funds to establish or maintain child care facilities on any of its'. three campuses. Despite
studies and surveys clearly reflecting the need for such facilities,
the Community College District refused to take any action. 5

B.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM

There are two fundamentally different ways in which governmental actions may constitute invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The first, often termed "facially discriminatory" action, occurs
when there is an explicit classification of persons by reference to
criteria such as race, sex, religion or ancestry. Such improper
bases for differentiation, when legitimate governmental objectives are not substantially furthered, are unlawful.

Facially Neutral Action
The second way in which a violation may occur is more subtle, as it focuses upon the results of the action rather than the
form of the action. Such actions, while not discriminatory in form
(facially neutral), may produce effects that adversely and disproportionately weigh upon members of particular protected groups
of individuals and will require explanation in terms of noninvidious purposes.
4. 20 u.s.c. § 1681 (1976) (hereinafter Title IX). Title IX provides, in pertinent part:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any educational
program or activity receiving Federal financing assistance."
5. Plaintiffs further alleged: "The District would not have been required to spend any
of its own funds, nor to donate any of its own facilities as private sources could have
provided the required matching funds and locations for the centers." 582 F.2d at 49.
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This theory of facially neutral discrimination, as developed
by the United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis" and
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 7 requires proof of two essential elements: discriminatory effect and invidious discriminatory intent or purpose. K Unless disproportionate impact is shown to be the product of intentional discrimination by an official, the government action will
not be subject to strict scrutiny and the government will not be
required to show compelling state interest. The requirement of
proof of these two elements severely restricts the ability of a court
to find a suspect classification and therefore find unacceptable
discrimination. It greatly decreases the likelihood of invalidating
such facially neutral government action. 9
The De La Cruz Holding
De La Cruz is noteworthy in that the Ninth Circuit found
sufficient allegations in the pleadings for both discriminatory
impact or effect and discriminatory purpose requirements. The
Ninth Circuit analyzed a series of cases decided by the Supreme
CourtlO and determined that the cases demonstrate that the term
6. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
7. 429 U.S. 252 (1976).

8. In discussing and reaffirming their holding in Washington v. Davis, the United
States Supreme Court in Arlington Heights stated it was
clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely
because it results in racially disproportionate impact. Dispro·
portionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the whole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination. Proof of ra·
cially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
429 U.S. at 264·65. See also, Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and
Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961;
Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause:
Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburg, 12 HARV. C.R.·
C.L.L. REv. 725 (1977).
9. For a discussion of the Washington test versus a pure impact test and a suggested
"causation principle," see Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theo·
ries of Constitutional Adjudication. 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36 (1977). In this article the author
argues that the Washington impact test, as formulated by the United States Supreme
Court is too narrow, allowing heightened scrutiny of government acts only where there is
a showing of intentional discrimination. The author proposes that equal protection should
require special scrutiny wherever such disproportionate impact is reasonably attributable
to race or other suspect classifications regardless of motive.
10. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (complainants established a prima
facie case of gender. based discrimination through the use of facially neutral height and
weight employment standards resulting in disproportionate impact upon women appli·
cants); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (exclusion of black applicants from employ.
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discriminatory impact only serves to describe disproportionate
consequences of official action, and as such "operate[s] only to
signal the beginning of analysis-an analysis which must ultimately answer the question whether the effected discrimination
is invidious and thus unlawful."l1
Majority/Dissent Conflict Concerning Equal Protection

Plaintiffs alleged in this case that the lack of child care facilities deprived them of access to equal educational opportunities
in the district in a way which almost exclusively burdens women.
The majority found such allegations to be legally indistinguishable from the disproportionate impact and discriminatory
effect of Lau v. Nichols 12 and Arlington Heights in that access to
benefits was alleged to have been denied in a manner overwhelmingly burdensome to a particular protected group.
The dissent, however, distinguished Lau since the benefits
sought there were part of a mandatory, imposed system of primary and secondary education. In this case, the college education
sought by plaintiffs is not mandatory, nor as critical, so that the
discriminatory burden alleged here was not imposed upon plaintiffs as it was in Lau. The majority conceded that although this
must be a consideration in viewing the totality of defendants'
conduct, it cannot form the basis of dismissal on the pleadings.
Principally, the dissent would find no sufficient allegation of
discriminatory effects in this case based upon the holdings of the
United State Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello,13 General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,14 and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty.15
ment in the District of Columbia police department caused by the use of a qualifying test
found discriminatory); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (denial of housing and resulting employment opportunities through refusals to rezon~
for low and moderate income housing found discriminatory); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974) (failure to provide supplemental courses in English to non-English speaking students, having the effect of depriving such students of an equal educational opportunity
found discriminatory); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (established claim
of discrimination due to disqualification of disproportionate numbers of blacks from employment or job transfer through requirements not shown to be related to successful job
performance or legitimate business need).
11. 582 F.2d at 52.
12. 414 U.S. 563; see note 9, supra.
13. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
14. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
15. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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Geduldig is interpreted by the dissent to hold that invidious dis-

crimination is not evident where actions do "not single out any
person or group for inferior treatment, but is merely less inclusive
of benefits than some might desire."16 Moreover, the dissent
would apply the holding of Gilbert: that no discriminatory effect
may be found where no proof is shown that the package of benefits is more valuable to men than to women. Discrimination, the
dissent argues, is found only where the action imposes a burden
upon one group not suffered by another group, as held in Sa tty.
The dissent would find that no discriminatory effect exists where
the relative value of included benefits offered to men are not
shown to be greater than that offered to women. Therefore, the
mere refusal to extend the additional benefits of child care facilities to women would not be sufficient to show discriminatory
effect in this case, reasons the dissent.17
This analysis by the dissent reflects a conservative, constructionist view of equal protection. Under such a view, particularly
with facially neutral action, one is less likely to find discriminatory effect. In contrast, the majority holding of this case is much
more liberal in its interpretation of discriminatory effect and disproportionate impact.
16. 582 F.2d at 66 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
17. The dissent would also rely upon Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), as
controlling, to support a contention that the inactivity of the Community College District,
in declining to extend an additional benefit of disproportionate value to a group, is not
actionable. The dissent finds the situation in Palmer analagous, in that the refusal to
operate a swimming pool by the City of Jackson, Mississippi did not constitute a denial
of equal protection. The dissent states:
Although the decision of a government body not to initiate or
support a particular social or economic program can certainly
be said to have an effect or impact upon those who would be
its beneficiaries, to say that such an effect or impact is discriminatory merely because a certain group would have benefitted
from it more than others is a quantum jump from the traditional understanding of discrimination.
582 F.2d at 69 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
The majority on the other hand sees Palmer as not controlling the resolution of this
case.ld. at 55-56 n.7. The primary question decided upon was whether illicit motivation
alone could render otherwise valid official action constitutionally invalid. The majority
notes that at no point in its opinion did the Supreme Court expressly confront or resolve
the question whether refusal to extend benefits can be said to have a discriminatory effect.
The majority would narrowly interpret Palmer to hold that invidious motivation alone wiJI
not suffice to establish a constitutional violation and that no showing was made in that
case concerning what state action would be considered discriminatory. ld. Therefore,
Palmer is not seen as controJling in this case.
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The majority, in rebutting the analysis by the dissent, distinguishes Geduldig and Gilbert from De La Cruz in that these cases
did not proceed upon a theory of discriminatory effect, but rather,
upon a theory of facial discrimination. This is due to the fact that
disabilities resulting from pregnancy in Geduldig and Gilbert
were so gender-specific as to make such distinctions discriminatory on their face. The majority would read the holdings of these
decisions in this limited context.
Continuing with an analysis of Gilbert, the majority points
out that although no attempt was made by respondents in Gilbert
to meet the burden of demonstrating gender-based discriminatory effect, the Court in Gilbert, in analyzing what would be
sufficient to show discriminatory effect, stated that where "there
is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to men than to
women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory
effect simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do
not receive benefits, or simply because an employer's disability
plan is less than all-inclusive."ls The majority interprets this
analysis to show "that a finding of discriminatory effect could be
sustained where sufficient proof establishes that 'the package is
in fact worth more to men than to women,' notwithstanding its
facial neutrality and notwithstanding the circumstance that the
challenged action took the form of a mere refusal to confer additional benefits. ".19
Additionally, the majority finds that Satty is not inconsistent with its' analysis of Geduldig and Gilbert. In Satty, the determination that respondents' failute to prove discriminatory effect
of an action legally indistinguishable from that in Gilbert lends
further credence to the analysis made here by the majority. lithe
facially neutral action were immune to such proof, the determination made in Satty would be surplusage.
18. 429 U.S. at 138·39. Congress has since specifically included disparate treatment
due to pregnancy into the protections afforded by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e·17 (1976) through its amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, Pub. L. 95·555, §1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), thus abrogating the specific holding of
.Gilbert that exclusion of pregnancy from coverage of a disability benefits plan did not
violate Title VII. This amendment prohibits all discriminatory treatment due to preg·
nancy but does not require employers to treat pregnant women in any particular manner
in employment.
The statute does not affect the analysis as used in Gilbert, Geduldig, Satty or the
present case.
19. 582 F.2d at 55 n.6.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

39

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 7

66

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:27

In light of the preceding analysis, the majority distinguishes
these cases from the present facts:
The benefits not granted or programs not offered
in each of the above cases were not alleged to have
been essential or even related to the enjoyment of
benefits already conferred or programs already in
existence . . . . [The actions] did not impair the
value of the included coverages. Here, by contrast,
the essence of plaintiff's grievance is that the absence of child care facilities renders the included
benefits less valuable and less available to
women; in other words, that the effect of the District's child care policy is to render the entire
"package" of its educational programs of lesser
worth to women than to men.:U

By broadening the scope of the overall value of benefits to be
considered in discriminatory effects analysis the majority is liberally allowing proof of invidious discrimination beyond what was
previously possible. This may be a step towards great liberalization of equal protection attacks upon facially neutral actions resulting in greater protection of constitutional rights.
Full Evidentiary Record vs. Pleadings

Aside from issues of discriminatory effects or invidious purpose, the majority places great emphasis upon the fact that the
dissent relied upon ~ases whose holdings are based upon relatively full evidentiary records rather than upon mere construction
of the pleadings as is the case here. As stated in Davis: "[A]n
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality ofthe facts."21 It is necessary to determine whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor through
"sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available."22 The majority, therefore, finds it too
early to dismiss this litigation based upon allegations of intentional thwarting of all attempts to provide child care facilities by
the defendants. This denial of child care facilities allegedly results in the effect of depriving substantial numbers of women
from equal access to educational opportunities in violation of
equal protection. Although no determination of the level of scru20. [d. at 56.
21. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
22. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 266.
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tiny required is made, the court does indicate that upon a threshold showing of discriminatory purpose on remand it would "be
necessary to determine whether the injuries they claim may fairly
be attributed to its improper consideration."23
C.

THE TITLE IX CLAIM

The Title IX issue raised by the plaintiffs' pleadings involves
the question of whether the Act provides plaintiffs with any private right of action. The Ninth Circuit held a private right was
available to the plaintiffs in De La Cruz.
At the time De La Cruz was tried, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit had concluded, in Cannon v. University of
Chicago,24 that no private right of action existed. Cannon has
since been overruled by the United States Supreme Court 25 which
held that a private right of action does exist under Title IX despite the absence of any authorization in the statute.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Seventh Circuit holding
in Cannon, which held that the requisite state action ingredient
was absent, defendants being a private university, from the
facts in this case because of the clearly constituted state action
alleged to have been taken by the Community College District.
The Ninth Circuit came to this holding through the drawing
of an analogy between Title IX and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 196426 and the United States Supreme Court's decision in
23. 582 F.2d at 59. This is to be determined through a test of "causation":
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by
a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have
required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof
would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the
impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were established, the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer
fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances,
there would be no justification for judicial interference with the
challenged decision.
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 270-71 n.21.
24. 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976).
25. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), reading in part: "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
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Lau v. Nichols. 27 Although the question of whether an implied
right of action exists was not directly presented in Lau, 'the court
noted that: "Given the close relationship between Title VI and
Title IX and the Supreme Court's decision in Lau, we conclude
it would be anomalous to deny plaintiffs here the right to raise
asserted violations of Title IX.".28 Therefore, "[t]he abstract similarities between the claims successfully urged in Lau and other
cases and those alleged here are too striking to allow the dismissal
of these claims to stand."29
D.

STANDING TO SUE

The defendants challenged the four plaintiffs' standing to
sue asserting that since three of the plaintiffs were presently students in the District and the fourth a prospective high school
graduate, no causal relationship existed between any action or
policy of the District and the alleged lack of educational opportunities for the plaintiffs. The court, however, found that plaintiffs did have standing to sue as the plaintiffs' grievances had not
become any less palpable or distinct to them because they were
attending college or expected to go to college, nor did the fact that
several had made temporary arrangements for the care of their
children eliminate from the case the alleged burdens and uncertainties they claimed to suffer as a result of the challenged policy.
Plaintiffs had alleged a particularized injury, namely, the denial
of their access to higher education which was asserted to have
concretely and demonstrably resulted from defendants' actions,
seeking redress by the remedy sought, thus meeting the requirereceiving Federal financial assistance."
27. 414 U.S. 563.
28. 582 F.2d at 60. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, based
its holding upon an analysis of four factors in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975):
(1) Whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which plaintiff is a member;
(2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy;
(3) whether implication of such a remedy is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme;
(4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject matter involves an area basically of concern
to the States.
441 U.S. 688-89 n.9. See also Comment, Private Rights o{ Action Under Title IX, 13 MARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 425 (1978),
29. 582 F.2d at 61.
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ments of the Ninth Circuit for standing to sue as set forth in
Bowkes u. Morton. 30

E.

CONCLUSION

The De La Cruz holding is a narrow one concerning the sufficiency of the pleadings. The court continually stressed that it was
making no comment on the merits of the case. It may ultimately
be shown that the dissent is correct concerning the final disposition of the litigation, but at this stage of the proceedings, plaintiffs must at least be allowed a trial on the merits. The significance of the allegations involved would seem to indicate that the
better view is to allow further proceedings, thus resulting in a fair
disposition of the case upon a full consideration of the facts.
The majority has' taken a bold step in distinguishing
Geduldig, Gilbert and Satty. The dissent would hold no discriminatory effect due to an equality of value of existing benefits, but
the majority significantly broadens the valuation of benefits by
also considering the effect of the further burden of child rearing
imposed due to the refusal to allow the establishment of child
care centers. It is the overall value of the "package" of benefits
that the majority focuses upon. Albeit, upon the surface the value
of benefits to both men and women are equal, deeper analysis will
demonstrate that the value of benefits to women is illusory due
to the fact that these benefits are effectively excluded through the
denial of child care facilities.
If followed by other courts, this concept could,greatly affect
the entire area of equal protection. The liberal approach used in
the analysis by the Ninth Circuit in the majority opinion is reasonable since to follow the more conservative approach advocated
by the dissent would only blind one's self to the realities of the
actual opportunity of women to enjoy the benefits available. The
majority would simply recognize the overall, effective value of the
benefits in light of ancillary burdens and recognize any resultant
discriminatory effect. The dissenting view would not; simply
stops its analysis at the surface benefits conferred.

Both the majority and the dissent discuss the role of' the
judiciary in reviewing such actions as alleged here. 31 The views of
30. 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976).
31. As stated by the majority, they have fulfilled "the proper role of the federal
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both are reconcilable although their results differ in this case. The
dissent would not intervene where only discriminatory intent is
alleged, assuming, as developed in the dissenting opinion, that
discriminatory effects have not been adequately alleged. 32 But the
dissent also states: "[O]nly after discriminatory effects are
shown. . . intent becomes relevant to the validity of a legislative
or administrative act. "33 The majority would also normally "show
great deference to local democratic processes and refrain in most
instances from interfering with decisions of school authorities."34
But as the court recites from Arlington Heights,35 there are times
judiciary in overseeing the decisions of local administrative bodies in the field of public
education." 582 F.2d at 47.
The Ninth Circuit took this same role in Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe
Elementary School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978). Here the Ninth Circuit held that
failure to provide bi-lingual education to elementary school students of MexicanAmerican and Yaqui Indian origin did not violate equal protection.
As the Ninth Circuit points out, the United States Supreme Court has held that
education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1978). The state action of defendants to
cure these language deficiencies was held to be rationally related to legitimate state
interests since it did not fail "to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation
in the political process." 582 F .2d at 37.
The court held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does
not impose a duty to provide bilingual-bicultural education as sought by the plaintiffs.
The programs initiated by the school district to cure existing language deficiencies of these
non-English speaking students was held to have fulfilled defendant's equal protection
duty.
Additionally, the court held that bilingual-bicultural education is not required by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), as the remedial education provided
already complies with making available meaningful education and equality of educational
opportunities. The Equal Education Opportunity Act of the Education Amendments of
1974, Section 204, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976), also would not require such programs as
plaintiffs desire as they were held not to be mandatory as "appropriate action to overcome
language barriers that impede equal participation by its students." 587 F .2d at 1030.
32. Upon elaborating on the inappropriateness of judicial interference the dissent
states:
Insisting that a plaintiff surmount that threshold [showing of
discriminatory effect) is precisely what safeguards against the
judicial excess. . . . Should the judiciary intervene before the
threshold of unequal treatment is crossed, however, and extend
its power of judicial review to cases where treatment is not
unequal, but motive may be impure, then the courts are, in
effect passing judgement on the character and qualifications of
the officers themselves and the government bodies through
which they act rather than upon their official acts.
582 F.2d at 72 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
33. [d. at 71 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 62.
35. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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when judicial deference cannot be justified as when both discriminatory effect and purpose are shown. Therefore, where both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent or purpose are both
present the majority and dissent would agree that judicial review
is appropriate.
As recognized by the court, De La Cruz reflects a problem of
national importance: the disadvantage created by the burden of
child rearing. The court found this burden "comparable to a wide
spectrum of conditions afflicting many other members of the student population; such as acute impediments to sight, hearing, or
mobility and a narrow margin of economic self-sufficiency requiring students to be wage earners while attending college."36 Although it is not the prerogative of the judiciary to resolve these
problems, the Ninth Circuit held that this case could not be
resolved upon a construction of the pleadings.
The impact of this decision is significant because it broadens
the areas and issues of discrimination encumbering equal educational opportunities that may be alleged for remedy through the
judicial process. The real impact of this decision will not be
known until the ultimate disposition of the litigation. Should a
denial of equal educational opportunity in fact be found in this
case through the fourteenth amendment or Title IX, a tremendous impact upon the educational system in the United States
will result. De La Cruz is an important decision in having shown
that on the pleadings, invidious discrimination may be alleged
upon a showing of discriminatory effect through the decreasing
the value of included benefits otherwise equal in value among
classes through an action which, on its face, is neutral.

Wayne B. Chew
V.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

United States v. Pinkus, 579 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. Aug., 1978).
In a prosecution for obscenity, the defendant must meet a twopronged test to establish the admissibility of comparable materials. The test includes a showing that the proffered materials bear
a reasonable resemblance to the allegedly obscene materials
which are the subject of the prosecution. In addition, the defen36. [d. at 64.
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dant must establish "a reasonable degree of community acceptance of the proffered comparables." The court also found that
the decision on whether or not to admit the com parables, and if
so, how much of such e.vidence shall be admitted, is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. The decision should be made
by the trial judge after a hearing out of the presence of the jury.
In United States v. Quijada, 588 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. Nov.,
1978), the Ninth Circuit ruled that a conviction for attempt to
distribute cocaine cannot be attacked on the basis of impossibility if the jury believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant intended to distribute cocaine. The case was one of first
impression in the Ninth Circuit. Defendant distributed the substance, which was discovered to be lidocaine hydrochloridenot a controlled substance, to an undercover agent. ·He was
arrested and charged with distribution of cocaine, after a field
test so identified the substance. In later laboratory tests, the
substance was identified as lidocaine. Two jury trials resulted in
mistrials and he was convicted at a third trial.
The court refused to distinguish between factual and legal
impossibility. The jury was correctly charged with the necessary
elements for a conviction of an attempt to commit a crime, including a specific intent to commit a crime and the commission
of an overt act. Based on the evidence submitted, the court determined it was not unreasonable for the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant believed he was distributing cocaine, thus meeting the required illegal intent to withstand an
attempt conviction.
In Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. Aug., 1979), the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the term "person" does not include a
deceased for purposes of the Ku Klux Klan Act. The estate of
decedent sued various public officials for an alleged conspiracy to
cover up the wrongful death of decedent by three police officers.
The complaint also stated a cause of action against the police
officers for decedent's wrongful death under the Ku Klux Klan
Act, which cause of action was not part of the instant appeal.
The actions complained of, allegedly committed by the defendants other than the police officers, all occurred subsequent
to the death of decedent. The court held that a person's civil
rights terminate upon death, so that acts committed after the
victim's death may not be the subject of a conspiracy to deprive
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decedent of his civil rights. The court distinguished cases which.
allow a wrongful death action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985" (1976), such as the case involving the three police officers
who shot decedent, to survive where state law permits such actions.
In United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. July,
1979), the Attorney General, representing the United States,
filed suit in the District Court of Montana, seeking injunctive
relief based on the deprivation of constitutional rights of mentally retarded patients confined in unsanitary and unsafe conditions in facilities of the state of Montana. The Ninth Circuit,
avoiding any opinion on the merits of the case, determined that
the only remedy available to the United States by the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bm of Rights Act is the withholding of federal funds for failure to comply with procedural requirements of the Act.
The court held that the doctrine of separation of powers requires that the United States have specific statutory authority or
"some interest that can be construed to warrant an implicit
grant of authority" in order to have standing" to sue. Such an
implicit grant of authority has been found in cases involving national security, obstruction of interstate commerce, and some pecuniary interest on the part of the United States. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, in addition,
contains state advocacy provisions which provide ample protection for the rights of the patients. The court relied on the doctrine of federalism as well as the traditional requirement that the
complainant suffer some injury in fact, within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute. Reluctantly, the court agreed
that the United States is not entitled to relief.
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